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MISSOURI v. JENKINS: ARE WE REALLY A
DESEGREGATED SOCIETY?
THEODORE M. SHAW*
The Brown decision bucked a centuries-old tradition of discrimination in
America, but that tradition has not been easily overcome. Professor Shaw dis-
cusses Missouri v. Jenkins and questions whether society has really changed in its
attitude towards segregated schooLk
N considering where the issue of school desegregation stands today, it
occurs to me that when Brown v. Board of Education I was decided in
1954, some thirty-seven years ago, the issues, although not simple for
that time, seem relatively very simple.
At home I have a reproduction of a lithograph by Norman Rockwell,
called "The Problem We All Live With." It shows a young, Black girl
being escorted by federal marshals into a school. The wall behind them
is smeared with tomatoes; the ugly racial epithet "nigger" is written on
the wall. It is a very powerful portrait, but very simple in the picture it
presents. The issues were very simple.
In retrospect, I think the issues were much more complex than we
thought, even a decade or two ago in the middle of the struggle to imple-
ment Brown. The issue of school desegregation is really a story of race
relations in this country. We view schools as a contained environment-
a laboratory of sorts-where we have children gathered together as stu-
dents. We can inculcate them with norms and values in a way that we
cannot with the rest of society; society is not as contained. It is in the
public schools that we attempt to remake America and to wipe away the
ugly stain of segregation and racism. I want to talk about two cases here:
one that illustrates how difficult it is to clear away racism, and one that
exemplifies where we are today.
The first case, Missouri v. Jenkins,2 comes out of Kansas City, Mis-
souri. It is a suit that was filed in 1977, but that had its roots in the pre-
Brown days of "separate but equal." 3 It was filed after many years of
investigation by the Office of Civil Rights and the efforts of community
people to implement the Brown mandate.
After the Brown decision, the Kansas City School District, which was
primarily White at the time, took a number of actions to maintain and to
reinforce segregation-the same kinds of actions that took place in
countless other cities throughout the country. The school district redrew
its boundary lines to mirror residential segregation. It ceded a school to
a Black community only when the community had become predomi-
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1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
3. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
nantly Black, thereby tracking the pattern of "White flight." It would
assign Black children to overcrowded schools rather than to schools with
available space to avoid any measure of integration.4 In other words,
throughout the 1960s, the Kansas City School District, like many other
school districts, engaged in the tactics of delay and resistance.
Finally, as the demographic patterns that had been set in motion de-
cades ago continued to operate, and were aggravated by the actions of
the school district, the school district became predominantly Black in
the 1970s.' What were these demographic-affecting actions that had pre-
ceded Brown v. Board of Education 6? The State of Missouri, of course,
required segregation in public schools.7 But there were also actions
taken by other state actors-housing officials that encouraged and pro-
duced segregation in housing,' and real estate brokers licensed without
any scrutiny of their discriminatory and segregative practices. 9 There
were also discriminatory practices by the federal government in the con-
struction and placement of public housing which was segregated at one
time by federal mandate.10 The federal government also segregated fed-
erally subsidized housing. Moreover, during the post-World War II
"suburbanization" of America, the federal government refused to insure
mortgages in racially heterogeneous areas and neighborhoods."
There were restrictive covenants.' 2 I bought a house in Ann Arbor
last month and looked through the history of all the deeds. I found a
restrictive covenant running in the deeds; it had remained in place, or at
least had been recorded, through the 1950s until the 1960s, even though
the enforcement of racially restrictive covenants were declared unconsti-
tutional in Shelley v. Kraemer"a in 1948.
In sum, Kansas City, like many other metropolitan areas where school
desegregation cases have been litigated, is fairly typical of what happened
in this country. We are a very ahistorical society. Segregation in this
country is not fortuitous. It is the result of decades and decades of local,
state, federal, and private actions, all of which have interacted to produce
the segregative patterns that exist now. We take these patterns for
granted, and we assume them to be the result of choice, or merit, or some
other kind of factor that ignores the history of racism and segregation.
In Jenkins, we put that evidence before the district court judge in Kan-
sas City. He rejected it.' 4 He rejected the arguments regarding inter-
4. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1492-93 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
5. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 35 (W.D. Mo. 1985).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1503.
8. See id. at 1501-02.
9. See id. at 1502-03.
10. See id. at 1497-98.
11. See id. at 1497.
12. See id. at 1491.
13. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
14. Jenkins, 593 F. Supp at 1490-91.
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district segregation (similar to those advanced unsuccessfully by the
plaintiffs in Milliken v. Bradley 15), and he rejected them in much the
same way that the Supreme Court rejected the evidence in Milliken.' 6 It
was an adjudication of the merits that was determined by a preordained
outcome. The judge appeared to know, from day one in my view, that he
was not going to allow inter-district desegregation as a remedy; he was
not going to get suburban school districts involved. He ignored all kinds
of evidence and jumped through all kinds of hoops, did all kinds of con-
tortions, to reach the final result.
He even, for example, ignored the inextricable link between schools
and housing 7 that the Supreme Court noted in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education 18 in 1971. The Jenkins plaintiffs tried
to introduce evidence demonstrating that, when people buy houses, one
of their primary concerns is the quality and the racial composition of the
school district. The district court judge would not hear or credit that
evidence. 19 It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the district court
judge rejected evidence because he was engaged in a preordained adjudi-
cation of the merits.
The unfortunate and inadequate result is that, as in Milliken, the judge
limited himself to an intra-district remedy, and then began to use the
Milliken Il-type2 ° relief. Consequently, in Kansas City we have seen the
most extensive and expensive "desegregation" remedy ever ordered by
any court-approaching a billion dollars in educational improvements.
That may seem like a great deal of money, and indeed it is for a finan-
cially strapped school district that has not passed a tax levy or a bond
issue since the moment it became a majority Black school district in
1977. Finally, the plaintiffs were able to get financial, if not truly
desegregative, relief.
As a result of the remedy implemented in Missouri v. Jenkins,"1 the
system is better off than it was before the suit was filed. However, deseg-
regation gains have been modest at best. Whatever accomplishments
flowed from the court-ordered remedy may only be of passing signifi-
cance depending upon when and how the school district and the state are
released from court supervision.
What will happen at that point? The Supreme Court, in Board of Edu-
cation v. Dowell,22 has examined the issue of what happens to a school
district that is declared unitary because it has eliminated the vestiges of
segregation. Can a "unitary" school district abandon its desegregation
15. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
16. See Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1488.
17. See iL at 1492.
18. 402 U.S. 1, 14 (1971).
19. See Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1491.
20. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
21. 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
22. 111 S. Ct. 630 (1991).
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plan, usually a busing plan, and return to neighborhood, thereby segre-
gated schools?
School desegregation remedies have not eliminated the vestiges of seg-
regation; at best, they may have neutralized or circumvented the effects
of segregative actions. While a desegregation plan that utilizes "busing"
may allow students to escape segregated neighborhood schools, it does
not desegregate neighborhoods. Once a court releases a school district
from jurisdiction, the vestiges of segregation once again become opera-
tive, and students may not be able to escape them. What has the nearly
four-decade effort to desegregate public schools accomplished? Does it
amount to an effort to break the link, the causal connection, between
present segregated conditions and de jure segregation, that is, intentional
state segregation? If that is all it amounts to, then perhaps we have en-
gaged in a worthwhile struggle, albeit one that has only fleeting results.
That seems to be where the Court is heading, in fact. There are two
cases presently in the Supreme Court, one coming out of De Kalb
County, Georgia, Pitts v. Freeman, 3 and, of course, the Court is going to
have the opportunity to look at the Topeka case24 again.
I maintain that many courts, as Judge Jones and Drew Days indicated
in their discussions, failed in terms of their duty or responsibility to look
at the violation and then provide a remedy simply because the task was
too much for them. Some judges did it with a great deal of courage, and
we applaud them. But many of the courts failed because they knew they
would have to remake society. So they treated, in effect, these issues as if
they were nonjusticiable. We are left with a legacy of separate and une-
qual schools as we enter the twenty-first century. That is tragic.
School districts like Kansas City, Little Rock, and numerous others,
once involved in segregating their own students internally, helped to set
in motion demographic forces that overwhelmed those school districts
and their communities. Belatedly, they have become advocates of deseg-
regation, or even integration. But demographic patterns dictate that
their advocacy be on the inter-district level. These late desegregation
converts have become plaintiffs in school desegregation cases, seeking
Milliken 11 relief against the state in an attempt to circumvent the limita-
tions imposed by the Supreme Court in San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez 5 and other cases. These attempts have met with
limited success, but in the apparent twilight of desegregation, school dis-
tricts and their patrons cannot be sanguine about the financial and segre-
gation perils they face. Absent a change in judicial direction or national
policy, the future is not bright.
This is a tribute to Thurgood Marshall. I was born in 1954, about six
23. 887 F.2d 1438 (1Ith Cir. 1989), rev'd and remanded, Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct.
1430 (1992).
24. Brown v. Board of Educ., 892 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1989), vacated and cert.
granted, 112 S. Ct. 1657 (1992).
25. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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months after the Brown26 decision. Certainly the Brown decision
changed the world that I was born into, and the world for all of us. I
grew up in the shadow of the civil rights movement, and Thurgood Mar-
shall was one of my heroes. I read about him; I read about Constance
Baker Motley; I read about the other great lawyers of the Legal Defense
Fund. The effort that they were engaged in, that Judge Jones was en-
gaged in with the NAACP, has been a noble and a great effort.
The problem is not that anything was inherently wrong with that ef-
fort; the problem is that it was not taken far enough. I think that per-
haps that was America at its best moment-certainly the Supreme Court
at its best moment, in my view. So they remain heroes to me. I want to
close by acknowledging their efforts and the work they have done. To
borrow a phrase from Frederick Douglass, in another battle in this war,
this discussion about race will go on in spite of those who want to wish it
away. We need to replenish the ranks of those engaged in this struggle. I
hope that some of you do that.
26. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

